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Abstract: In this paper, I consider the relationship between Inference to the Best Explanation 
(IBE) and Bayesianism, both of which are well-known accounts of the nature of scientific 
inference. In section 1, I give a brief overview of Bayesianism and IBE. In section 2, I argue that 
IBE in its most prominently defended forms is difficult to reconcile with Bayesianism because 
not all of the items that feature on popular lists of “explanatory virtues”—by means of which 
IBE ranks competing explanations—have confirmational import. Rather, some of the items that 
feature on these lists are “informational virtues”—properties that do not make a hypothesis H1 
more probable than some competitor H2 given evidence E, but that, roughly-speaking, give that 
hypothesis greater informative content. In section 3, I consider as a response to my argument a 
recent version of compatibilism which argues that IBE can provide further normative 
constraints on the objectively correct probability function. I argue that this response does not 
succeed, owing to the difficulty of defending with any generality such further normative 
constraints. Lastly, in section 4, I propose that IBE should be regarded, not as a theory of 
scientific inference, but rather as a theory of when we ought to “accept” H, where the 
acceptability of H is fixed by the goals of science and concerns whether H is worthy of 
commitment as research program. In this way, IBE and Bayesianism, as I will show, can be 
made compatible, and thus the Bayesian and the proponent of IBE can be friends. 
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Introduction 
Despite the popularity of both Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) and Bayesianism as accounts 
of the nature of scientific inference, up until recently there has been remarkably little dialogue 
between proponents of IBE—i.e. “IBE-ists”—and Bayesians. Perhaps this lack of serious 
engagement between IBE-ists and Bayesians can be attributed to the fact that prominent supporters 
of IBE (Psillos 2004, 2007) and Bayesianism (van Fraassen 1989) have urged that the two views are 
incompatible. However, since the Bayesian approach and IBE are both prima facie plausible ways in 
which to understand the nature of scientific inference, it would be undesirable if IBE and 
Bayesianism were, upon final analysis, fundamentally incompatible. While Bayesianism is no doubt 
the dominant theory of confirmation, IBE plays a central role in debates in general philosophy of 
science, such as the realism/anti-realism debate and the problem of under-determination.1 Thus, 
since philosophers of science have appealed to IBE as a way to tackle important problems, we 
should want to know how IBE connects up with Bayesianism. Given the apparent virtues of the two 
accounts, it would be most attractive if IBE and Bayesianism were not only compatible, but, in the 
end, mutually reinforcing. Ideally, IBE-ist ideas would be of use to Bayesians in solving some of the 
problems raised by critics and vice versa. As I will argue, however, certain features of IBE, as the 
view is articulated by its prominent proponents, renders a compatibilist view difficult to defend. In 
broad outline, this is because not all the virtues that feature on the lists of explanatory virtues upheld 
by IBE-ists have confirmational import. In light of this, I suggest that we ought not to view IBE as a 
theory of scientific inference at all, but rather as a theory of when a hypothesis H is “acceptable”, 
where, roughly-speaking, this concerns whether H is worthy of commitment as research program. 
                                               
1 Traditionally, defenders of scientific realism who rely on the so-called “No-Miracles Argument” formulate their 
defense of realism as an inference to the best explanation, e.g. Putnam (1975), Boyd (1983), Psillos (1999). Moreover, 
appeals to explanatory virtues such as simplicity are often made as a kind of tie-breaker in cases in which theory is under-
determined by data. See, for instance, Kukla (1994) for a critical discussion of the appeal to “non-empirical” virtues as a 
possible solution to the under-determination problem. 
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1. Bayesianism and IBE 
Bayesianism has a central place in contemporary discussions of theory confirmation, rationality, 
evidence, etc., and so I will only briefly review some of its key features. First, Bayesians claim that 
rational agents can be thought of as having “degrees of belief” or “credences” with respect to 
propositions, a notion which corresponds intuitively to how strongly the agent believes a 
proposition. Second, these degrees of belief can be modeled as a probability distribution, satisfying 
the standard axioms of the mathematical theory of probability.2 Third, for an agent to be rational, at 
any given time, her personal probability function (Pr-function) must be constrained so as to obey 
the axioms of probability.3 Lastly, in addition to the synchronic requirement of obeying the axioms, 
most varieties of Bayesianism assert that a rational agent must also update her degrees of belief over 
time in light of new data by the rule of subjective conditionalization:4 
For any hypothesis H, any body of evidence E, and any times ti and tj, where i<j, upon 
learning E at tj, Pri(H|E)=Prj(H), where Pri(H|E) is the probability of H given E at ti and 
Prj(H) is the probability of H at tj.  
 
One handy way of calculating the quantity Pr(H|E) is by way of Bayes’ theorem, which, when 
considering two hypotheses H and ~H is given by the equation: 
𝑃𝑟(𝐻|𝐸) =
𝑃𝑟(𝐻)𝑃𝑟(𝐸|𝐻)
𝑃𝑟(𝐻)𝑃𝑟(𝐸|𝐻) + 𝑃𝑟(~𝐻)𝑃𝑟(𝐸|~𝐻)
5 
                                               
2 Credences are tracked by and for some Bayesians conceptually identified with betting behavior. For instance, if the 
agent believes with certainty, i.e. with a credence of 1, that some proposition A is true, then she would be willing to 
purchase a bet that pays $1 if A is true at a price ≤ $1, if she has a credence of 1/2 that A is true, then she would be 
willing to purchase a bet that pays $1 if A is true at a price ≤ $.5, etc., if she has a credence of 1/4, then she would be 
willing to purchase such a bet at a price  ≤ $.25, etc. 
3 Formally, the agent’s personal credences can be represented as a function from a set of propositions S to the set of real 
numbers R, such that for each proposition A∈S, A satisfies the three axioms of probability theory: 1) Pr(A) ≥ 0 (Non-
Negativity), 2) If A is a tautology, then Pr(A) = 1 (Normality), and 3) If A is incompatible with some proposition B∈S, 
then Pr(A v B) = Pr(A) + Pr(B) (Finite Additivity). Additionally the conditional probability of A given B, i.e. Pr(A|B) 
satisfies, and for some Bayesians is defined by, the “Ratio Formula”: 𝑃𝑟(𝐴|𝐵)  =
𝑃𝑟(𝐴&𝐵)
𝑃𝑟(𝐵)
.  
4 Subjective conditionalization assumes that when some piece of evidence E is learned, Pr(E) = 1. In cases in which the 
agent increases her credence in E to some value x, where x<1, then the agent may update by a more general rule, called 
“Jeffrey conditionalization”: Pj(H) = Pi(H|E)Pj(E) + Pi(H|~E)Pj(~E). See, Jeffrey (1983). Henceforth, I will neglect the 
issue of uncertain evidence and assume that whenever E is learned, Pr(E) = 1.  
5 For a finite partition of hypotheses H1, H2,…Hn, Bayes’ theorem can be generalized as: Pr(𝐻𝑖|𝐸) =
 Pr(Hi)Pr(E|Hi) 
∑ j Pr(Hj)Pr(E|Hj)
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As a theory of scientific inference, Bayesianism includes an account of when the evidence E 
confirms a hypothesis H. The standard qualitative Bayesian account of confirmation is simple. For 
any H and any E, E confirms H if and only if Pr(H|E) >Pr(H).6  
The view that the above two normative constraints are necessary and sufficient for a rational 
Pr-function is often called “Subjective Bayesianism”. Some philosophers insist in addition that a 
rational Pr-function must satisfy further constraints, such as, for instance, the Principal Principle 
(Lewis 1981), according to which one ought to set one’s credences to conform with known objective 
chances (with some caveats about admissible evidence). The more normative constraints placed on 
what counts as a rational Pr-function, the more “objective” Bayesianism becomes. In the limit, 
“Objective Bayesianism” (e.g. Carnap 1962) is the name sometimes used for the position according 
to which there is only one rationally permissible Pr-function. 
Discussions of IBE trace back to Harman (1965), who appears to have coined the term. 7 
Harman characterizes IBE in the following way: 
In making this inference one infers, from the fact that a certain hypothesis would explain the 
evidence, to the truth of that hypothesis. In general, there will be several hypotheses which 
might explain the evidence, so one must be able to reject all such alternative hypotheses 
before one is warranted in making the inference. Thus one infers, from the premise that a 
given hypothesis would provide a “better” explanation for the evidence than would any 
other hypothesis, to the conclusion that the given hypothesis is true (1965: 89).  
 
IBE is typically formalized in a four-step inference pattern (e.g. Psillos 2002; Lycan 1988), such as: 
(1) F is some fact or collection of facts  
(2) Hypothesis H1, if true, would explain F sufficiently well. 
                                               
6 As an account of the nature of scientific inference, Bayesianism also includes some quantitative account of how much E 
confirms H. There are many options on offer. One example which is not without its problems is the “Difference 
Measure” (Carnap 1962: 21-22), according to which the degree to which E confirms H is given by Pr(H|E) – Pr(H). A 
full account of scientific inference would include a quantitative measure as well, but we need not take any stand on this 
question here. See Fitelson (1999) for a discussion of the plurality of measures. 
7 As Harman (1965: 88-9) notes, something like IBE often goes by many names one of which is “abduction”, a term 
coined by C.S. Peirce. But despite some similarities between Peirce's abduction and IBE, it has been argued that viewing 
abduction as the intellectual forbearer of IBE is not historically accurate, e.g. Minnameier (2004), Campos (2011). One 
key difference between Peirce’s abduction and IBE is that the former belongs to the context of discovery, while the 
latter belongs to the context of justification. For Peirce, it seems abduction is just the way one invents a new hypothesis, 
and so it is not warrant-conferring. For instance, Peirce writes: “[a]bduction is the process of forming explanatory 
hypotheses. It is the only logical operation which introduces any new idea” (CP 5.172). 
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(3) No competing explanations H2, H3,...Hn would explain F better than H1. 
(4) Therefore, one is justified in believing that H1 is true over its competitors. 
 
 The most important step for the purpose at hand is the third. Most IBE-ists propose that we 
ought to rank the success of an explanation by reference to various so-called “explanatory virtues”.  
Accordingly, H1 is a good enough explanation to the extent that H1 possesses these virtues to a 
sufficiently high degree, and H1 is a better explanation than its competitors H2, H3,...Hn to the extent 
that H1 exhibits these virtues to a higher degree than its competitors. Proponents of IBE differ with 
respect to what belongs on the list of explanatory virtues, although there is much overlap in their 
lists, and at times the differences are merely terminological. 
An early source for understanding theory choice by way of a list of informal and imprecise, 
albeit intuitive, criteria can be found in the writings of Thomas Kuhn. Despite his not explicitly 
defending IBE, it is striking how much articulations of IBE have in common with the picture of 
theory choice sketched by Kuhn in the 1969 post-script to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) 
and in later works (e.g. his 1977). In rejecting the radical relativism that eager postmodernists had 
imputed to him, Kuhn insisted that genuine, scientific progress is possible. For Kuhn, such progress 
is mediated in a messy, non-linear fashion by a non-exhaustive list of virtues, including: accuracy, 
consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness, all of which constitute “standard criteria for evaluating the 
adequacy of a theory” and “…provide a shared basis for theory choice” (1977: 321-22).  
Another early source for understanding theory choice in this manner is Quine and Ullian 
(1970), who despite also not explicitly defending IBE, endorse the following virtues: conservatism, 
which consists in not conflicting with already held beliefs; modesty, which corresponds to logical 
weakness; simplicity, which when dealing with mathematical equations, corresponds to the degree, or 
the order of an equation (e.g. Jeffreys 1931), but in other cases is harder to define; generality, which 
corresponds to the applicability of a hypothesis to wide-ranging circumstances; and, refutability, which 
corresponds to the familiar Popperian notion that a hypothesis should be in principle falsifiable.  
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 As for self-avowed IBE-ists, Thagard (1978) defends three virtues: consilience, which 
corresponds to how much a theory explains and the extent to which it unifies disparate domains of 
evidence; simplicity, which corresponds to the size of the set of auxiliary assumptions needed by a 
hypothesis in order to explain the data, and perhaps the number of entities postulated; and analogy, 
which corresponds to a preference for old, already accepted mechanisms and processes. Similarly, 
Psillos (2002: 614-6) discusses the virtues of consilience, which corresponds to fit with background 
data; completeness, which corresponds to explaining all the relevant data; importance, which corresponds 
to explaining “salient” phenomena; parsimony, which corresponds to the size of the set of auxiliary 
assumptions needed by a hypothesis to explain the data; unification, which corresponds to bringing 
together disparate bodies of data under one explanatory hypothesis; and precision, which corresponds 
to articulating a precise causal-nomological mechanism to explain the data. Finally, Lipton mentions 
many of the same virtues, such as “mechanism, precision, scope, simplicity, fertility or fruitfulness, 
and fit with background belief” (2004: 122). In what follows, I will primarily focus on the virtues put 
forward by Lipton, since his book-length defense of IBE is the most comprehensive. For the sake of 
organization, below is a table connecting the terminology that I will use to discuss the virtues with 
the approximately equivalent terms used by other IBE-ists and philosophers given to virtue-talk: 
 
 It is not my purpose here to discuss the intricacies of IBE, but one common objection to the 
view should be mentioned. Given that what constitutes an explanation is a matter of long-standing 
My Terminology  Other Terminology  
Scope Generality (Quine and Ullian); Consilience (Thagard) 
Explanatory power Completeness (Psillos); Consilience (Thagard) 
Mechanism Precision (Psillos) 
Simplicity Parsimony (Psillos); Simplicity (Thagard) 
Unification Consilience (Thagard) 
Fit with background 
data 
Conservatism (Quine and Ullian); Consilience (Psillos); Analogy (Thagard) 
Precision Precision (Psillos)  
Empirical Adequacy Accuracy (Kuhn) 
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debate,8 one might think, as Salmon (2001a: 68) does, that IBE can really have “no clear meaning” 
until the disputes regarding the nature of explanation are resolved.9 However, in my view, whether 
H1 constitutes an explanation according to one of the extant philosophical models— e.g. the 
Deductive-Nomological model (Hempel and Oppenheim 1948), the Statistical Relevance model 
(Salmon 1971), the Unificationist model (Friedman; 1974; Kitcher 1989), the Causal model (Salmon 
1984; Woodward 2003), etc.— does not seem to do any real justificatory work. Rather, the feature 
that justifies any application of IBE is that the hypothesis does well with respect to the various 
virtues listed above. Presumably, any hypothesis that does well with respect to those virtues will be 
confirmed in accordance with IBE. Indeed, it seems right to say that a hypothesis counts as an 
explanation in this context just in case it does well with respect to the explanatory virtues. Whether 
that hypothesis constitutes an explanation according to one of the extant models of explanation is 
beside the point. Thus, it is no problem that proponents of IBE (e.g. Lipton 2004; Psillos 2002) 
want to stay with respect to the debates surrounding the various models of explanation. 
2. The Central Difficulty for Compatibilism   
Contemporary discussion of the relationship between IBE and Bayesianism begins with van 
Fraassen’s critique of IBE in his Laws and Symmetry (1989). There, van Fraassen argues that if a 
Bayesian agent also uses IBE, then the agent will be subject to a Dutch book, which is supposed to 
indicate that the agent is irrational. 10 To make his argument, van Fraassen combines IBE and 
Bayesianism by assigning a post-conditionalization probabilistic boost to hypotheses that are more 
explanatory. Clearly, if adopted as a rule of updating, this will lead to diachronic incoherence. Van 
Fraassen’s Dutch book argument against IBE has been criticized elsewhere. Generally, proponents 
                                               
8 See Salmon (1989) for an important critical survey of analyses of the concept of explanation in the 20th century. 
9 In a direct response, Lipton (2001: 100) resists this criticism, arguing that our grasp of the concept of an explanation is 
good enough, even in the absence of a widely agreed-upon philosophical account. It should be noted, Salmon (2001b: 
122) concedes this point in a further response to Lipton.  
10 That is to say, if the agent adopts IBE as a rule of updating, then there exists a series of bets, each of which the agent, 
will individually sanction as fair, but which together logically guarantee a loss. See Roche and Sober (2013) who take 
themselves to be making a similar argument against IBE, although one that does not rely on pragmatic features. 
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of compatibilism with respect to IBE and Bayesianism (e.g. Okasha 2000; Lipton 2004; Weisberg 
2009, etc.) take issue with the ad hoc way in which van Fraassen incorporates IBE into the Bayesian 
framework. Compatibilists have argued that there are other, more plausible ways to reconcile IBE 
with Bayesianism, and these views are not subject to a Dutch book argument.11 
 In this section, however, I will raise problems for the compatibilist project. One lacuna in 
contemporary discussions of the relationship between IBE and Bayesianism is that the indispensable 
role that the virtues are supposed to play in justifying any application of IBE is all but universally 
neglected.12 If IBE is to be compatible with Bayesianism, then at the very least, the explanatory 
virtues that are upheld by IBE-ists must be truth-conducive, which is to say that the virtues must 
have some bearing on the probable truth of hypotheses that manifest them. As I will argue below, it 
is not the case that all the virtues on IBE-ists’ lists of explanatory virtues meet this standard. 
2.1 Reformulating the Question  
According to the standard Bayesian account of confirmation, a hypothesis H is confirmed by a body 
of evidence E if and only if Pr(H|E)>Pr(H). Presumably then, if we want to show that IBE is 
compatible with the Bayesian account of confirmation, we would need to show that, for each 
particular virtue V of some version of IBE, if a hypothesis H1 has V and some rival H2 lacks V, then, 
other things being equal, H1 will not only be confirmed by E, i.e. Pr(H1|E) > Pr(H1), but in addition, 
the degree of confirmation (DOC), according to some measure, of H1 will be higher than that of H2.  
 However, one problem with attempting to show that the DOC of H1 is higher than the 
DOC for H2, provided H1 has the virtues and H2 lacks them, is that often it is difficult to know what 
to say about the prior probability of the evidence. When we expand Pr(H|E) in accordance with 
                                               
11 Here, I will pass over those discussions of the relationship between IBE and Bayesianism that explicitly reject the key 
assumptions of Bayesianism, e.g. Betz (2013: 3555), along with those that propose or defend versions of IBE that are 
straightforwardly incompatible with Bayesianism, e.g. Douven and Wenmackers (2015), Douven and Schupbach (2015). 
12 Hitchcock (2007) is an exception, rightly noting that a full reconciliation between Bayesianism and IBE “can only be 
achieved (if at all) in a piecemeal fashion, through the identification of factors that contribute to explanatory loveliness, 
and an exploration of the ways in which these factors might plausibly influence the probability assignments of a Bayesian 
agent” (439). As I argue below, the prospects for fulfilling this project look grim. 
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Bayes’ theorem, Pr(E) shows up in the denominator. We can further analyze Pr(E), since it follows 
from the Law of Total Probability that Pr(E) = Pr(H)Pr(E|H) + Pr(~H)Pr(E|~H). But it is difficult 
to make sense of the value Pr(E|~H) in many cases. For example, if H = Newton’s theory of 
gravity (NTG) and ~H = Not-Newton’s theory of gravity (Not-NTG), then ~H is a long 
disjunction of every other alternative theory of gravity, including those that have yet to be thought 
of. If one has a value for Pr(H), then of course, Pr(~H) = 1 - Pr(H). However, the value of 
Pr(E|~H) is the probability that the disjunction of every alternative possible theory of gravity 
confers on the evidence. Without knowing what those possible alternative theories of gravity are, it 
is difficult to say anything about the value of Pr(E|~H). But, if that’s true, then we can’t determine 
the value of Pr(E). In this case, it will be quite difficult, if not impossible, to decide if H1 will have a 
higher DOC than H2, provided that H1 has the virtues and H2 lacks them. 
 One way around this problem is to compare the posterior probabilities of H1 and H2 where 
H1 and H2 are incompatible hypotheses but not together exhaustive.  By Bayes’ theorem and some 
algebra it follows that Pr(H1|E) > Pr(H2|E) if and only if Pr(H1)Pr(E|H1) > Pr(H2)Pr(E|H2). That 
is, H1 is better supported by the evidence E if and only if the product of the prior and the likelihood 
of H1 is greater than the product of the prior and likelihood of H2. So, instead of trying to determine 
if it is true that for each virtue V, if H1 has V and H2 lacks V, then, other things being equal, the 
DOC of H1 is greater than H2, we can try to answer the constrastive question concerning the 
relationship  between Pr(H1|E) and Pr(H2|E). Now we want to know: for each virtue V, if H1 has V 
and H2 lacks V, then, other things being equal, is it true that Pr(H1|E) > Pr(H2|E)? This question is 
much more tractable than trying to decide if having the virtues will make H1 confirmed by E and 
afford H1 a higher degree of confirmation than H2, which lacks those virtues. 
 With respect to the contrastive question, however, I argue that we should answer in the 
negative. In a discussion of Kuhn’s view of theory choice in the context of Bayesianism, Salmon 
9 
 
(1990: 197) notes in passing that, while some of the criteria put forth by Kuhn, such as consistency 
and simplicity, seem to be confirmationally relevant, some of Kuhn’s other criteria are not 
confirmational. Rather, some criteria are what Salmon calls “informational virtues”, properties that 
do not make a hypothesis H more probable, but that, roughly-speaking, give H greater content.13 
Hypotheses that excel with respect to informational virtues say more about the world, but they are 
not made more probable by virtue of having these virtues. I claim that this feature that is of true 
Kuhn’s list of virtues is likewise true of IBE-ist lists of virtues: only some of the IBE-ist virtues are 
confirmational virtues, whereas others are informational virtues. Since IBE mixes informational and 
confirmational virtues, it is difficult to see how IBE could be made compatible with Bayesianism. 
2.2 The Confirmational Virtues 
Of course, some of the virtues upheld by IBE-ists are relevant to whether Pr(H1|E) > Pr(H2|E). 
These virtues are thus what I call “confirmational virtues”. If the confirmational virtues are to make 
a difference in the comparative posteriors of H1 and H2, then possession of any confirmational virtue 
must make it the case that, other things being equal,  Pr(H1) > Pr(H2) or Pr(E|H1) > Pr(E|H2).  
 As for the confirmational virtues, simplicity may be one of them, depending on what IBE-ists 
mean by simplicity. One notion of simplicity defended by IBE-ists relates to the number of auxiliary 
assumptions needed to derive a prediction by a theory (e.g. Thagard 1978; Psillos 2002). Other 
things being equal, this notion of simplicity has confirmational import. If Pr(T1 )=Pr(T2), and both 
T1 and T2 entail some evidence E, but if T1 requires a multitude of auxiliary assumptions A1, which 
we have no good independent reasons to believe, then this will make Pr(T1&A1) quite low. On the 
other hand, if T2 can derive E with a more modest set of auxiliaries A2 , then this fact will make it the 
case that Pr(T1&A1) < Pr(T2&A2). Of course, whether Pr(T1&A1) < Pr(T2&A2) will depend on 
substantive background assumptions, in particular the nature of A1 and A2.  If A2 is a proper subset 
                                               
13 Salmon also claims that some of Kuhn’s criteria are “economic” virtues—which concern how useful is to employ the 
theory for. While some of the virtues put forth by IBE-ists may be economic, I will not address this issue further.  
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of A1, then certainly Pr(T1&A1) < Pr(T2&A2). However, this is seldom the case. Normally, A2 and A1 
are only partly over-lapping sets. Still, this notion of simplicity tracks something which often makes 
a difference in the comparative posteriors of two competing theories. 
A form of unification is defensible as confirmationally relevant as well. As Mcgrew (2003: 562) 
notes, if we assume that for two competing hypotheses H1 and H2 that Pr(H1)=Pr(H2), and that for 
some pieces of evidence E1, E2,…En, Pr(En|H1) = Pr(En|H2) for all n, then if H1 unifies the 
disparate pieces of evidence in the sense of making E1, E2,…En, positively relevant to each other, i.e. 
Pr(E1&E2&…&En|H1) >Pr(E1|H1) × Pr(E2|H1) ×…×Pr(En|H1) and H2 does not unify E1, 
E2,…En, i.e. Pr(E1&E2&…&En|H2) = Pr(E1|H2) × Pr(E2|H2) ×…×Pr(En|H2), then it follows by 
Bayes’ theorem that Pr(H1|E1&E2&…&En) >Pr(H2| E1&E2&…&En). Thus, it seems that the 
probability calculus straightforwardly vindicates one particular notion of unification.14  
Furthermore, empirical adequacy is sometimes cited as an explanatory virtue (e.g. Mackonis 
2013), which if placed on one’s list is clearly a confirmational virtue. If a hypothesis H entails some 
observational consequence O, then, provided 0<Pr(H)<1 and 0<Pr(O)<1, it follows again from the 
probability calculus that Pr(H|O) >Pr(H). Since Bayesianism vindicates hypothetico-deductive 
confirmation given a few caveats, to the extent that H is found to be empirically adequate, i.e. its 
observational consequences turn up true, then H will be confirmed. If we suppose, for two 
competing hypotheses H1 and H2, that H1 entails O, and H2 does not, then this too will make a 
difference in the comparative posteriors of H1 and H2, as then Pr(O|H1) > Pr(O|H2). 
Another virtue upheld by IBE-ists that is clearly confirmational is fit with background data. If 
H1 better fits with background data than H2, then one way of making sense of this claim is that 
Pr(H1|K)>Pr(H2|K), where K is one’s set of background knowledge. Hitherto, for the sake of 
                                               
14 For a more extensive and technical treatment of this idea, see Myrvold (2003) who also agrees that “the ability of a 
theory to unify phenomena consists in its ability to render what, on prior grounds, appear to be independent phenomena 
informationally relevant to each other” (400). See Lange (2003) for a critique and Schupbach (2005) for a reply. 
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readability, I have suppressed the background K. But, of course, any probability statement should be 
relativized to some K. To the extent that H1 is better supported by the background data than H2, the 
(relativized) prior probability of H1 will be higher than that of H2. 
Finally, one last virtue cited by IBE-ists (e.g. Okasha 2000) is explanatory power.15 One way to 
make sense of explanatory power construed as a particular virtue is in terms of likelihoods (Sober 
1990). Often, when we say that H1 better explains E than H2, we mean that, although H2 may be 
compatible with E, still, H1 makes E more likely than H2.
16 Consider the oft-cited passage by Darwin: 
It can hardly be supposed that a false theory would explain, in so satisfactory a manner as 
does the theory of natural selection, the several large classes of facts above specified. It has 
recently been objected that this is an unsafe method of arguing; but it is a method used in 
judging of the common events of life, and has often been used by the greatest natural 
philosophers (1962: 476). 
 
A plausible way to interpret what Darwin means when he says that the theory of natural selection 
explains several “large classes of facts” is that his theory has a higher likelihood than creationism: 
Pr(large classes of facts|Darwin’s theory)>Pr(large classes of facts|creationism). If H1 has a higher 
likelihood than H2, then this fact will make a difference in the comparative posteriors of H1 and H2. 
2.3 The (Non-confirmational) Informational Virtues 
However, not all of the virtues cited by IBE-ists are confirmational virtues; rather, as I have 
suggested, some of them are informational virtues. Although informational virtues give a hypothesis 
greater informative content, these virtues are not properties that necessarily have a bearing on the 
probabilistic inequalities that are relevant to assessing the relationship between the posterior 
probabilities of H1 and H2. For instance, consider again the list put forth by Lipton “mechanism, 
precision, scope, simplicity, fertility or fruitfulness, and fit with background belief” (2004: 122). At 
                                               
15 Of course, conceptually identifying explanatory power with likelihoods is problematic because Pr(E|E)=1 ≥ Pr(E). 
Just because some hypothesis entails the phenomena, it does not follow that the hypothesis explains the phenomena. 
16 Sometimes “explanatory power” is used as a catch-all term to refer to how well a hypothesis does with respect to all 
the virtues (e.g. Thagard 1993; Psillos 1999; Mackonis 2013). But it is also common to use “explanatory power” to 
designate one virtue in particular (e.g. Okasha 2000; McGrew 2003; Glymour 2015). 
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least the first three are informational virtues and thus lack confirmational import.17 Let’s consider 
first the virtue of mechanism. According to Lipton’s IBE, other things being equal, to the extent that 
H1 provides a causal-nomological mechanism to account for E, whereas H2 does not, then H1 does 
better with respect to the virtues than H2. In this case then, H1 is a better explanation than H2, and 
so, in accordance with IBE, H1 is more likely to be true. But if we understand “more likely to be 
true” to mean “has a higher posterior probability”, i.e. Pr(H1|E) > Pr(H2|E), then this claim is false. 
Let H1 be the hypothesis that specifies the physio-chemical details of salt’s dissolving in 
water, and let H2 be the hypothesis that salt dissolves in water because water has the solubility virtue. 
Now, it is not clear how to interpret H2, but one way is to say that H2 posits that there is some 
property or set of properties had by water which disposes water to dissolve salt. And this is true. 
The solubility virtue is water’s dipolar nature. For any given water molecule, its hydrogen atoms are 
partially positively charged and its oxygen atom is partially negatively charged. The positively 
charged hydrogen atoms of water molecules are attracted to the negatively charged chlorine ions and 
the negatively charged oxygen atoms are attracted to the positively charged sodium ions. The water 
molecules by way of this electromagnetic attraction surround the sodium and chlorine atoms that 
make up salt crystals and dissolve the table salt. Let P1 be this physio-chemical explanation, (or 
rather the complete explanation which includes those details I’ve left out).  
Now, clearly H1 is a better explanation than H2 because H1 cites P1 in explaining the 
phenomena, but, contrary to what IBE-ists want to say, H1 is not more likely to be true because H1 
entails H2. It seems that H2 is really at bottom a statement of the form “There exists some causal 
mechanism by which water dissolves salt” and H1 is a statement of the form “There exists some 
causal mechanism by which water dissolves salt & that mechanism is P1”. Clearly then, H2 cannot be 
less probable than H1 because H2 is entailed by H1. In the future, however unlikely, P1 might turn 
                                               
17 Lipton (2004) seems aware of this (116), but not that it is in tension with his view of IBE as theory of confirmation 
(62), nor with his claim that his version of IBE can be reconciled with Bayesianism (103-120). 
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out false, and thus H1 will be falsified. But H2 will most likely survive, since it says less about the 
world than H1. No matter what happens in the future of chemistry, water will probably continue to 
have the solubility virtue. To be sure though, H1 does better than H2 with respect to the virtue of 
mechanism, and so, if we take IBE seriously, then IBE should say that Pr(H1|E) >Pr(H2|E). But 
this claim runs afoul of a theorem of probability theory according to which the logically stronger 
proposition necessarily has a probability less than or equal to the logically weaker hypothesis. 
Precision suffers from the same problem as mechanism. The virtue of precision says that, 
other things being equal, if H1 gives more details than H2, then H1 is a better explanation of the 
evidence E better than H2. Thus, IBE-ists such as Lipton and Psillos who admit precision as a virtue 
in one form or another, should say that Pr(H1|E) >Pr(H2|E). But let H1 be “Fields F1 and F2 differ 
in the average height of corn stalks by .5 meters” and let H2 be “There is some difference in the 
average height of corn stalks in F1 and F2”. Here, H1 is more precise than H2, and so according to 
IBE, since H1 is a better explanation than H2, other things being equal, H1 is more probable than H2. 
This can’t be true, however, for the same reason above: H1 entails H2, and so Pr(H1) ≤ Pr(H2). 
With respect to scope, as Salmon (1990: 196-7) in his discussion of Kuhn’s criteria of theory 
evaluation points out, Newton’s theory has greater scope than the conjunction of Galileo’s law of 
falling bodies and Kepler’s three laws of planetary motion. This means that Newton’s theory 
explains phenomena beyond the conjunction of the laws of Galileo and Kepler.18 Newton’s theory 
entails the conjunction of Galileo’s law and Kepler’s laws, but of course the IBE-ist will want to say 
that Newton’s theory is rationally preferable because of its greater scope. But if Newton’s theory 
entails the laws of Galileo and Kepler, then Newton’s theory cannot be more probable than the 
conjunction of Galileo’s and Kepler’s laws. Scope is only an informational virtue. That some 
hypothesis H1 has greater scope than some rival H2 does not necessarily make H1 more probable. 
                                               
18 This is true only if we ignore the small corrections to the laws of Galileo and Kepler that Newton’s theory makes.  
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It is because all the intended justificatory work of IBE is done by the virtues and because 
IBE-ists often include informational virtues on their lists of explanatory virtues that a compatibilist 
view according to which Bayesianism provides a direct, formal explication of IBE is bound to fail. 
Consider, for instance, the “emergent-compatibilism” of Henderson (2014), which attempts to 
reconcile Lipton’s version of IBE with Bayesianism. On Henderson’s view, IBE and Bayesianism are 
compatible because “a Bayesian who adopts constraints on her probabilities, which are reasonable 
on her own terms, would end up favouring more explanatory theories”, and so “IBE would ‘emerge’ 
without the Bayesian doing anything differently from what she would anyway”(2014:12-13). While 
Henderson is right that IBE and Bayesianism license some of the same inferences, if IBE-ists include 
informational virtues on their lists of virtues, those which have no confirmational import, then in 
principle IBE will not emerge as a natural consequence from the Bayesian framework.19  
3. The Compatibilist Response: An Appeal to Objective Bayesianism 
To the argument I make in the previous section, the proponent of reconciling IBE and Bayesianism 
might object on two counts. First, one might object that when discussing the virtues, we should only 
compare incompatible hypotheses. I argued that mechanism, precision, and scope cannot be 
confirmational virtues, because for each virtue, even if some hypothesis H1 excels with respect to 
that virtue, we could imagine some competitor H2 that lacked that virtue, but which nonetheless 
could not be less probable than H1, because in each case H1 entailed H2, and so according to the 
probability calculus, it is necessarily true that Pr(H1) ≤ Pr(H2).  But, one might argue, if we are 
assessing hypotheses for their the explanatory virtues,  we should compare, say, an H1 which claims 
there is a mechanism to explain E and some competitor H2 which denies there is such a mechanism, 
instead of one which commits to some mechanism but does not spell out its details. Second, one 
might object that the argument illicitly assumes a subjective form of Bayesianism. Indeed, one of the 
                                               
19  One case that Henderson (2014: 703-711) focuses on is the preference for Copernicus’ theory over Ptolemy’s theory. 
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reasons that Psillos (2007: 447), a dyed-in-the-wool IBE-ist, argues that IBE is incompatible with 
Bayesianism is that the latter allows for too much subjectivity in the setting of prior probabilities. 
The IBE-ist wants to say that one ought to infer the best explanation of the evidence, not merely 
that doing so is rationally permissible. Even if one has a higher conditional credence in the lower 
quality explanation, one still ought to infer the best explanation of the evidence. So, already it seems 
that IBE is offering more normative constraints than Subjective Bayesianism endorses. 
 Perhaps it’s impossible to derive all of the IBE-ist explanatory virtues, such as scope and 
mechanism, purely from the probability calculus. Even so one might claim that such virtues still 
ought to function as normative constraints on what counts as a rational Pr-function. With this in 
mind, one might think that locating IBE explicitly in the Objective Bayesian framework will increase 
the prospects of a successful marriage between IBE and Bayesianism. A number of philosophers 
have endorsed versions of this sort of compatibilism, a view which I will call the “Objective 
Bayesian approach”. Recent advocates of the Objective Bayesian approach (Huemer 2009; Weisberg 
2009; Poston 2014) have argued that the best way to integrate IBE into the Bayesian framework is to 
think of IBE as providing extra normative constraints on the objectively correct Pr-function, or the 
range of permissible ones.20 If additional constraints on what counts as a rational Pr-function can be 
defended by appealing to explanatory virtues, then this would go some way in overcoming the 
subjectivity of Subjective Bayesianism. It would also be attractive to the IBE-ist, since it would give 
the explanatory virtues independent normative status within Bayesianism. 21 
                                               
20 It should be noted that although Psillos (2007: 447) claims that IBE and Bayesianism are incompatible, he expresses 
sympathy toward a marriage between IBE and Objective Bayesianism. Lipton (2007: 458) too expresses sympathy with 
the Objective Bayesian approach, holding out hope that there is a “normatively privileged way of assigning priors and 
likelihoods” that will vindicate the explanatory virtues of IBE. 
21 This is in contrast to other versions of compatibilism, endorsed by Okasha (2000), McGrew (2003), and Lipton (2004) 
which attempt to reconcile IBE from within the subjective Bayesian framework. This brand of compatibilism argues that 
explanatory factors can be used as a kind of heuristic approximation to Bayesian inference, at which we are by our nature 
psychologically deficient. In my view, the position that IBE simply provides a kind of heuristic aid, which we might use 
instead of performing a Bayesian inference directly, robs IBE of much of its philosophical interest. See Douven (2005), 
Weisberg (2009), and Henderson (2014) for extensive criticisms of this version of compatibilism.  
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 Weisberg’s version of Bayesianism endorses what he calls “Objectivist Conditionalization”, 
which states that “[a]t any given time, your credence in an arbitrary proposition H ought to be 
p(H|E), where p is the correct a priori probability distribution, and E is your total evidence at that 
time”(2009: 137).22 Unlike most forms of Subjective Bayesianism, Weisberg’s Objective Bayesianism 
will count as irrational any Pr-function whose initial distribution of priors or whose likelihoods are 
not in accord with what p says. According to Weisberg and other proponents of the Objective 
Bayesian approach, we can appeal to IBE and explanatory considerations in general in order to help 
spell out the nature of p. In this way, IBE and Bayesianism might have a productive partnership. 
 Before evaluating the prospects of defending the virtues that don’t seem confirmationally 
relevant by the Bayesian’s lights as extra normative constraints, it would be helpful to look at some 
of Weisberg’s concrete proposals. Weisberg suggests three ways IBE could aid in the project of 
specifying the nature of p. Owing to considerations of space, I will only discuss two.23  
First, the Objective Bayesian can incorporate into p constraints inspired by a response to the 
grue problem by White (2005), who argues that we ought to believe the all-green generalization over 
the all-grue generalization because the all-green generalization has the property of stability, where 
“[a]n explanation of a fact F is stable to the extent that according to this explanation, F couldn’t 
easily have failed to obtain”(2005: 4). Because “green” leads to a more stable hypothesis than “grue”, 
p should satisfy the following inequality: p(All Green|All Observed Green)>p(All Grue|All 
Observed Green). Since the all-green and the all-grue hypothesis both have the same likelihood with 
respect to the evidence, the difference in their posterior probabilities must lie in the prior 
probabilities, such that p(All Green) > p(All Grue). In general, according to this proposal, to the 
extent that a hypothesis H is more stable than a rival H* given the evidence E, p(H|E) > p(H*|E).  
                                               
22 It should be noted that Williamson (2010) defends a version of Objective Bayesianism, but rejects Bayesian 
conditionalization, relying instead on the principle of maximum entropy as an updating rule. 
23 Weisberg’s third proposal is that explanatory factors can be used to patch up the Principle of Indifference (2009: 140), 
a canonical Objectivist principle that has fallen into disrepute (Sober 2002). See also Huemer (2009) for a similar view. 
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 A second suggestion of Weisberg’s takes its inspiration from the Best-Systems account of 
laws of nature defended by Lewis (1973). If worlds that are more simple and orderly will be better 
able to explain the facts—which is a central claim of the Best-Systems account—then Weisberg 
suggests that the Objective Bayesian can regard worlds that do not admit of a good deductive 
systemization as “explanatorily recalcitrant, and thus a priori improbable” (2009: 139). To avoid 
confusion with the notion of simplicity canvassed earlier, I will call simplicity in Weisberg’s sense 
“orderliness”. When comparing two hypotheses H and H*, if H describes a more ordered world 
than H*, or if H, given our total evidence E, allows for a deductive system in which we can better 
situate—and thereby explain—particular, local matters of fact than H*, then p(H|E) > p(H*|E).24 
3.1 Criticism of the Objective Bayesian Response 
To be sure, Weisberg’s proposals are meant to be only suggestive, but it is not clear, even if further 
details were provided, that additional constraints of this sort could be defended in any satisfactory 
way. While the idea of eliminating the subjectivity from Subjective Bayesianism by appealing to 
further normative constraints inspired by explanatory considerations is tempting, as I will argue here, 
the Objective Bayesian approach to compatibilism fails. As a result, appealing to Objective 
Bayesianism as a response to the problems I raise in section 2—as way a way to defend the 
confirmational import of what I’ve deemed merely informational virtues—proves unsatisfactory. 
For Weisberg, any hypothesis H that is more stable or more orderly than an unstable or 
disorderly competitor H* has a higher prior probability. But what is it about stability, or orderliness 
that makes H more probable when H has these features? The invocation of Objective Bayesianism 
                                               
24 This second suggestion of Weisberg’s is similar to Jeffreys’ “Simplicity Postulate” (1931), according to which given a 
set of competing hypotheses, the simpler hypotheses ought to be assigned a higher prior probability. One way Jeffreys 
applies this idea is to interpret simplicity as the degree of a polynomial equation relating two variables to each other (e.g. 
temperature and pressure) and to distribute priors in the following way: the simplest hypothesis H1 of some partition is 
to be assigned a prior of 1/2 , the next simplest H2 a prior of 1/4, H3 a prior of 1/8, and so on, where Hn receives a 
prior of (1/2)n. Thus, for instance, the model that posits a linear relationship receives a prior probability of 1/2, that 
which posits a quadratic relationship a prior probability of 1/4, that which posits a cubic relationship a prior probability 
of 1/8, etc.  See Sober (2015: 87-93) for a critical discussion of the Simplicity Postulate. 
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suggests that a defense of the epistemic relevance of these constraints will be a priori. Indeed, 
Poston (2014: 83-4)—who endorses the Objective Bayesian approach as part of his extended 
defense of explanatory coherentism of a broadly Quinean sort—takes simplicity to be intrinsically 
epistemically relevant and unanalyzable.25 Our justification for simplicity, if there is one at all, 
depends on reflectively considering our particular epistemic practices. This view is similar to that of 
Sider (2013: 3), who also considers simplicity—in the sense of positing few fundamental concepts or 
predicates—to be intrinsically epistemically relevant, our justification for which, Sider claims, is the a 
priori intuition that simplicity tracks truth. Of course, the problem with this sort of defense of 
orderliness, or stability, or any other explanatory virtue, is that it isn’t much of a defense at all. 
Rather than quixotically trying to justify a priori the truth-conduciveness of stability, 
orderliness, or any of the explanatory virtues, a more promising avenue is to appeal to the past 
success of theories that have had these properties. If it turns out that a large proportion of 
successful theories have had the explanatory virtues, then we might be justified a posteriori in 
employing them in our inferences about future phenomena. In this way, while a Pr-function that 
favors orderly hypotheses, or theories that are stable, or hypotheses that posit a mechanism would 
be rationally required in our world, such constraints would not apply to any conceivable Pr-function.  
The idea that IBE and the explanatory virtues might be defended on empirical grounds has 
already been taken up by Psillos (1999) in his defense of scientific realism. According to Psillos 
(1999: 77), what matters for justifying a rule of inference is that using that rule on balance produces 
more truths than falsehoods.26 To be justified in using some rule—in this case IBE—as an engine of 
inference, it is not necessary that we understand how that engine works, as it were. So, if appealing 
to the explanatory virtues upheld by IBE-ists has been historically successful in producing true 
                                               
25 While Poston may be right that there is no exhaustive analysis of simplicity that covers every plausible case, certain 
instances of simplicity can be given a deeper justification. See, for example, Forster and Sober (1994). 
26 Psillos (1999: 81) endorses externalism in general and reliabilism in particular, (e.g. Goldman 1986). On this set of 
views, it is not necessary to have some demonstration that an inference rule is reliable, as the internalist would demand. 
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beliefs, then—supposing that the reliability of the inference rule is all that’s needed for its 
justification—we would be justified in our belief that the explanatory virtues track truth. In this way, 
we would be justified in employing the virtues, including those whose confirmational import I 
doubted in section 2, even if they cannot be directly vindicated by the probability calculus.27 
However, the problem remains that the historical track-record of the explanatory virtues will 
most likely not survive detailed empirical scrutiny. 28 If any theory ever did well in terms of its 
explanatory virtues, this theory was Newtonian mechanics. Indeed, the 19th century historian and 
philosopher of science William Whewell exalted some of the properties of Newton’s theory—such 
as its successful explanation of Kepler’s three laws—as good-making features of scientific theories in 
general (1968: 153). When a theory explained different classes of facts which before had seemed 
unconnected, Whewell called this a “consilience of inductions.” For Whewell, we should think 
consilience is a virtue because the historical record “offers no example in which a theory supported 
by such consiliences, had been afterwards proved to be false” (1968: 295).  
Unfortunately for Whewell, the 20th century saw the overthrow of Newton’s theory of 
gravity in the form of Einstein’s. But even for those who would defend the more modest claim that 
the historical record more or less, though not perfectly, vindicates the explanatory virtues, the 
prospects look grim. As Sober (2015: 46-7) notes in a discussion of Whewell and this sort of a 
posteriori argument for a general criterion of simplicity, the track-record defense seems intuitively 
                                               
27 Interestingly, Salmon (1990), despite being a critic of IBE, offers this track-record defense of virtues such as simplicity 
and unification. According to Salmon (1990: 187), we can give the prior probabilities that feature in Bayes’ theorem an 
objective interpretation by understanding them “as our best estimates of the frequencies with which certain kinds of 
hypotheses succeed”.  
28 One might object, as Lycan (2002) does, that the track-record defense is in principle impossible because to argue, for 
instance, that simplicity has a successful track-record assumes that we can verify which hypotheses are true 
independently of our appeals to simplicity. But this is false. It is not as though we have access to all the true hypotheses 
and from there we can check to see that a high proportion of them have the virtue of simplicity. On the contrary, we 
believe that our hypotheses are true on the basis of simplicity. To respond to this worry, one might argue that, while we 
can’t inspect all the true theories from the view from nowhere and then see what proportion are simple, we can in 
principle investigate those theories which have been predictively successful and resisted disconfirmation for a long time 
and see what proportion of those theories have been simple, unifying, etc. If we have reason to believe that mature, 
predictively successful theories are true, and those theories are also simple, unifying, precise etc. then we would in 
principle be able to defend the track-record argument for the truth-conduciveness of explanatoriness.  
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plausible only because of our selective attention. We tend to remember those grand, elegant theories 
such as Einstein’s theory that turned out to be (more or less) successful, and discount the probably 
thousands of theories that did well by the IBE-ist explanatory virtues, but which were not so 
successful. But for this a posteriori defense to be legitimate we must look at both the successful and 
the unsuccessful explanatory theories and compare them. No adequate investigation of this sort has 
been undertaken to my knowledge, and even if it is in principle possible, it seems unfeasible. 
With regards to Weisberg’s concrete proposals, if any defense can be given of why we 
should regard an instance of stability or orderliness as truth-conducive, it would seem to depend on 
substantive background beliefs. For instance, White writes: “On the all-grue hypothesis we have two 
properties, greenness and having been observed, which are co-instantiated by the same subclass of 
emeralds. This is a striking fact which seems to call for an explanation” (2005: 18-19). This remark 
suggests that the problem with the grue hypothesis stems from its positing a correlation that is 
surprising given our background knowledge. We should expect some causal mechanism linking 
these two properties, supposing there is some connection. The fact that the all-grue hypothesis does 
not propose one makes it implausible. Similarly, in the case of Weisberg’s notion of orderliness, 
suppose we let H = “the gravitational force does not vary tremendously from location to location” 
and we let H* = “the gravitational force varies tremendously from location to location.” Intuitively, 
H is more orderly than H*. Since H has the virtue of orderliness, we should say that p(H) >p(H*). 
Of course, if we have a pre-existing reason to believe that forces in general remain constant in their 
strength and don’t vary will-nilly, then it would be right to think that Pr(H)>Pr(H*). However, it’s 
not clear that this move can be defended as a general constraint on p, absent some pre-existing 
reason to believe that the world is orderly, such as Newton’s belief that God made the world simple. 
But if the defense of these proposed explanatory virtues depends on substantive background 
beliefs, then, for the IBE-ist who wishes to locate IBE in the Objective Bayesian camp, such virtues 
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will not be the kind of criteria to impose as general normative constraints on a rational Pr-function. 
A Pr-function might justifiably favor theories without scope, or ones that don’t posit a mechanism, 
because of different justified background beliefs. Suppose, for instance, one already knows that 
positing a mechanism would be implausible. Suppose, for instance, that E is some spurious 
correlation, such as the positive correlation between the rise in British bread prices and Venice sea-
levels over the past few centuries (Sober 2001). If H1 posits a mechanism to explain E—say, an 
international conspiracy involving the Illuminati—then H1 may explain E, in the sense of providing 
a common cause to screen off the correlation. But H1 would be quite implausible. Given our 
background knowledge, clearly H2, which denies there is a mechanism, is preferable to H1.  
 The central problem that I have raised here is something that has not escaped the notice of 
Bayesians. Consider a discussion of Myrvold (2015) concerning “Common Origin Inferences” 
(Jansen 2002), those inferences which posit some common cause or other type of explanation to 
account for the phenomena. As Myrvold argues, it is difficult to justify with any generality a 
preference for this type of unification within the Bayesian framework. Rather, it is only unification in 
the sense canvassed above, which Myrvold (2003) and McGrew (2003) defend, i.e. making pieces of 
evidence mutually positively relevant, that increases evidential support. To be sure, sometimes it is 
preferable to posit a unifying causal mechanism in light of the data, because otherwise one would be 
admitting an implausible coincidence. However, the sort of methodological rule that underlies this 
judgment is as Myrvold rightly notes, nothing deep (2015: 13). It is simply the requirement that we 
have a low prior credence in hypotheses that are improbable. But, as I suggested above, whether a 
coincidence is in fact improbable, and so whether positing a mechanism is indeed a virtue, will 
depend on our background knowledge and the nature of the phenomena being investigated. 
In sum then, the Objective Bayesian response does not succeed in vindicating those virtues 
that I’ve argued are non-confirmational. In general, neither an a priori nor an a posteriori defense of 
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such virtues is plausible. This is likewise true for the further virtues proposed by Weisberg. So, even 
if we consider incompatible hypotheses instead of ones that are compatible, it is not clear how the 
virtues of mechanism, precision, or scope could be vindicated by the Bayesian’s lights. Sometimes 
what I have been calling informational virtues will have a bearing on probability assignments, but 
when they do, that will turn on one’s background knowledge and the nature of the problem at hand. 
Adopting these virtues as general constraints on a privileged Pr-function is thus unjustified. 
4. Reconceiving IBE as a Theory of Scientific “Acceptance” 
Despite the difficulty of vindicating the explanatory virtues upheld by IBE-ists from within the 
Bayesian framework—within both subjective and objective varieties—in this section, I will argue 
that this difficulty need not prevent the IBE-ist and the Bayesian from being friends.  One way to 
avoid the problem that I have highlighted is to remove the informational virtues from the lists put 
forth by IBE-ists. But if we do that, and keep, say, only those items like empirical adequacy or fit 
with background data, then we risk conceiving of IBE as a kind of un-precisified Bayesianism. This 
would make IBE and Bayesianism easily compatible but only at the cost of trivializing IBE.29 Indeed, 
proponents of IBE warn that we should not think of IBE as “inference to the likeliest explanation”, 
that is, inference to the explanation with the highest posterior probability (Lipton 2004: 60; Psillos 
2002: 617). Rather than rid IBE of its informational virtues to make it a more suitable, though 
uninteresting, theory of scientific inference, I propose that we keep those items on the list and re-
conceive the nature of IBE. Even if a theory is not made more likely than a rival to be true simply by 
having greater mechanism, scope, precision, etc., these are still properties that we want scientific 
theories to have. Informational virtues are still virtues; they are still good-making features of a 
scientific theory. This is an important point, which has been stressed especially by IBE-ists. If H1 
                                               
29 Some philosophers accept this deflationary view of IBE. For example, Ben-Menahem (1990: 324) equates explanatory 
merit with high probability, and happily admits that this trivializes IBE. See also, Cartwright (1983: 6), who remarks: “no 
inference to best explanation; only inference to most likely cause.” 
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exhibits the informational virtues to a much greater degree than H2, then other things being equal—
where, suppose Pr(H1) = Pr(H2)—there is some sense in which H1 is better than H2.  
 As I will argue, IBE should be thought of as an informal theory of scientific acceptance, where 
the degree of acceptability of H includes but is not exhausted by Pr(H).30 In broad outline, the 
acceptability of H concerns whether H is worthy of commitment as a research program, which in 
turn depends on whether H meets the goals of science. I will advance this view for a number of 
reasons: 1) we should want some concept of acceptance to make sense of scientific practice; 2) IBE 
constitutes a plausible theory of what makes a hypothesis acceptable in one particular sense; and 
finally, 3) appeal to acceptance makes good sense of the relationship between IBE and Bayesianism. 
4.1 Acceptance, Non-epistemic Values, and the Goals of Science 
It’s a clear that scientists can take any number of attitudes toward a hypothesis H, of which belief is 
only one of them. Of course, some attitudes are more philosophically interesting than others. For 
instance, we shouldn’t be too much concerned if a scientist loves or hates H. Instead, we should be 
interested in what have been called “cognitive attitudes”, such as believing H, having a credence in 
H greater than .5, entertaining H for the purposes of pointing out its weakness, and accepting H, all 
of which consist in “an evaluative response to some content” (Elliott and Willmes 2013: 810-11). 
Crucial to understanding the proper relationship between IBE and Bayesianism is getting clear about 
the different sorts of cognitive attitudes scientists might take to a hypothesis or model, in particular 
this attitude of “acceptance”. What does it mean to accept H1 but not to believe H1?  
 In ordinary English “to accept” is often used synonymously with “to believe”. So, if ‘to 
believe H1” just means “to take H1 to be true”, and that is all that is meant by “to accept H1”, then 
Bayesianism will have much to say about the matter. At the very least, if it is rational to believe H1, 
                                               
30 The views of Dawes (2013) and Nyrup (2014), both of whom sketch a deflated view of IBE, are similar to the one that 
I advocate below, although differing in the details. My approach, however, is unique in that I propose reconceiving the 
nature of IBE as a solution to the problem of sorting out IBE’s relationship to Bayesianism. 
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then, absent some deviant account of the nature of belief, it ought to be the case that Pr(H1)>.5.
 31 If 
this condition did not hold, then one could rationally believe that P even though one is more 
confident that ~P. However, for one to utter “I believe that it will rain, but I am 60% confident that 
it won’t rain” seems irrational, if not incoherent. If anything, one ought to believe that it will not 
rain. 32 With this in mind, the success of the thesis that the IBE-ist informational virtues are relevant 
to what we ought to accept, but not to what we ought to believe, depends on a clear distinction 
between “belief” and “acceptance”, despite these terms often being used interchangeably. 
 The proposal that I make here concerning the informational virtues and acceptance of a 
hypothesis parallels a view that some philosophers take regarding the role of other non-epistemic 
values, e.g. political, moral, social, etc. in science.33 Traditionally, the view regarding the relationship 
between science and (non-epistemic) values is that scientific reasoning ought to be “value-free” (e.g. 
Levi 1960, McMullin 1983; Lacey 1999). The value-free ideal is often expressed by the claim that 
scientists ought to be “objective”; they ought not to let their ethical, political, or personal values 
influence their judgments about the truth of a theory. Certainly, non-epistemic values play a role in 
the selection of research questions, the allocation of funding, or the treatment of human test 
subjects. But these roles are external to the practice of science itself. Non-epistemic values ought to 
play no internal role in science, i.e. no role in a scientist’s judgments about a theory qua scientist.  
 Recently, however, in one way or another, it has become increasingly common to challenge 
the traditional value-free ideal (e.g. Brown 2013; Douglas 2000, 2009; Elliott and McKaughan 2014; 
Elliott and Willmes 2013; Kourany 2003, etc.). To do so, it is not necessary to deny a distinction 
                                               
31 On Kaplan’s view, “You count as believing P just if, were your sole aim to assert the truth (as it pertains to P), and 
your only options were to assert that P, assert that ~P, or make neither assertion, you would prefer to assert that P” 
(1996: 109). On this view, as Kaplan notes (1996: 111), it is possible to have very little confidence in P and still believe P. 
32 One might wish to assert the stronger principle that it is rational to believe that P if and only if  Pr(P)>.5; however, 
while this principle seems prima facie plausible, the lottery paradox (Kyburg 1961) shows that imposing the threshold 
Pr(P)>.5 (or any threshold aside from 1) as necessary and sufficient for its being rational to believe that P, assuming 
some plausible rational constraints on binary beliefs, leads to objectionable results. 
33 I will use “virtue” synonymously with “value” and “non-epistemic” synonymously with “non-confirmational” below. 
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between epistemic and non-epistemic values (e.g. Rooney 1992, Longino 1996). Even if we reject 
the idea that a theory is more probable on the basis of its moral or political virtues, non-epistemic 
values might still play an indirect role in setting the standard of evidence for accepting or rejecting a 
null hypothesis (Rudner 1953; Douglas 2000), for determining what hypothesis or model we ought 
to accept for some regulatory policy, or for managing risk (Elliott and McKaughan 2014), etc.  
 Fortunately, philosophers who oppose the value-free ideal in this way have already sought to 
clarify this distinction between belief and acceptance (e.g. Elliott 2011; Elliott and Willmes 2013). 
One useful account is that Elliott and Willmes (E&W) who define “acceptance” as follows:  
A subject S accepts a hypothesis (or model, theory, etc.) H if and only if S presupposes H for 
specific reasons in her deliberation (2013: 811).34 
 
On E&W’s account, acceptance is left deliberately vague so that there will be different, particularized 
notions of acceptance, such as acceptance for reasons of simplifying a task, acceptance for reasons 
of drafting regulatory policy, or acceptance for reasons of furthering future investigation. In this 
way, what one accepts will depend on contextual factors such as one’s chosen goals. From this, it 
follows that acceptance differs from belief, in that belief, plausibly, is not directly a matter of will. 
So, just as philosophers who oppose the value-free ideal argue that non-epistemic values can 
be relevant with regards to accepting a hypothesis as a basis for action, I argue that the informational 
virtues upheld by IBE-ists, which are difficult to defend as confirmationally relevant, ought to be 
regarded in a similar fashion. The particularized notion of acceptance that I argue we ought to 
associate with IBE most closely matches the third variety mentioned by E&W, namely acceptance in 
the sense of making a commitment to a hypothesis or theory as a research program. In The Scientific 
Image (1980), van Fraassen, nicely articulates this notion of acceptance: 
[A]cceptance involves not only belief but a certain commitment. Even for those of us who 
are not working scientists, the acceptance involves a commitment to confront any future 
                                               
34 As E&W note, this account is similar to that of Cohen (1992) and Bratman (1999), who also speak of acceptance as a 
matter of S’s presupposing some H in background deliberation, without necessarily believing H. 
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phenomena by means of the conceptual resources of this theory. It determines the terms in 
which we shall seek explanations. If the acceptance is at all strong, it is exhibited in the 
person's assumption of the role of explainer, in his willingness to answer questions ex 
cathedra. Even if you do not accept a theory, you can engage in discourse in a context in 
which language use is guided by that theory—but acceptance produces such contexts (12). 
 
For van Fraassen, to accept a theory T goes beyond believing that T is empirically adequate. Rather, 
to accept T involves some commitment to T. And to be committed to T goes beyond simply 
entertaining the possibility of T’s truth, but rather entails dispositions to pursue T as a research 
program.  Certainly, if T is worth committing to, then T should have a sufficient degree of 
plausibility. It would be foolish, for instance, to commit to T if one knows that T is false or very 
improbable.35 But it is certainly possible to commit to confront future phenomena in terms of the 
resources of T, to employ T in one’s future inquiry into, deliberations about, and explanations of 
phenomena, without believing T is true.36 The latter is all that I will mean by “acceptance” of a 
theory. 37  In fact, accepting a theory T in the sense of making a commitment to T in the manner 
described above—without believing T is true—seems to be something that scientists do all the time.  
 This fact is starkly evident in cases in which two well-confirmed theories from different 
domains turn out to be jointly inconsistent. Consider the controversy between biologists and 
physicists over the age of the Earth in the late 19th century. According to Lord Kelvin, one of the 
                                               
35 In accordance with E&W’s broad account of acceptance, one might accept for predictive purposes a theory that one 
knows to be false, one which, for example, contains obviously false idealizations. But if the one the goals of science is 
truth, then a theory without such idealizations is ultimately desirable.  
36 Of course, van Fraassen thinks that we should never believe T is true if T makes claims about unobservables. 
37 This increasingly popular terminological choice of using “acceptance” in a way that is severed from belief, which I 
admittedly perpetuate, is in some ways unfortunate. For instance, Laudan (1977: 108-114) articulates a distinction similar 
to the one that I am urging here in the context of IBE, distinguishing between the “context of acceptance” and the 
“context of pursuit”, where by “acceptability”, he means, as in ordinary English, “worthy of belief” (110). My use of 
“acceptance” most closely matches Laudan’s use of “pursuit” and its cognates. So, where Laudan would say, “scientists 
can have good reasons for working on theories they would not accept”(110), I would say, “scientists can have good reasons 
for accepting theories they would not believe.” Similarly, where Laudan would say, “we cannot be accused of inconsistency 
or irrationality if we pursue (without accepting) some highly progressive research tradition” (112), I would say, “we 
cannot be accused of inconsistency or irrationality if we accept (without believing) some theory with a high degree of 
explanatory content.” As I discuss below, I take Laudan’s concerns about fecundity seriously by including fecundity as 
one of the IBE-ist informational virtues. Unlike Laudan, however, I urge that for a theory to be acceptable (or worthy of 
pursuit for Laudan) it must have some degree of plausibility. Still, on my view, we are justified in committing to (or 
pursuing for Laudan) theories that we would be irrational to believe, a point that Laudan takes pains to emphasize. 
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most respected physicists of his day, the second law of thermodynamics was inconsistent with the 
uniformitarian geology assumed by evolutionary biology. One of Kelvin’s arguments was that the 
Earth as we know it can’t be very old because the sun is “assumed to be an incandescent liquid now 
losing heat” (1862: 159). For the sun to be at its present energy state, it would have had to have been 
so hot only 50 million years ago as to make the Earth molten hot, and thus unable to support life. 
So, the Earth did not seem to have the geological history that Darwin needed for the theory of 
evolution to be true. The discovery that the sun is powered by nuclear fusion by Hans Bethe in 
1939—for which he won the Nobel Prize—and that, moreover, this process emits an enormous 
amount of energy, allowed for older estimates of the age of the Earth and removed the tension that 
had existed between physics and biology. At the time, though, given that both thermodynamics and 
evolutionary biology were well-confirmed theories, certainly some scientists still accepted, i.e. were 
still committed to both Darwin’s theory and thermodynamics as research programs—although Lord 
Kelvin was not among them. However, it would be manifestly uncharitable to say that scientists 
believed both theories, in the binary sense, given that the two theories were jointly inconsistent.38 
But what determines in general whether a theory is acceptable in the relevant sense? 
Naturally, it would seem that the answer depends on the goals of science. A theory is worth 
committing to when it meets the goals of science. Put comparatively, a theory T1 is more acceptable 
than a rival T2, when T1 meets the goals of science better than T2. If the goals of science were simply 
to identify and have us believe theories that are highly probable, then the conditions under which T 
is acceptable, that is worth committing to and worth pursuing, would be no different than the 
conditions under which we are justified in believing T. I’ve mentioned that if T is acceptable, then T 
                                               
38 At present one of the most well-known pairs of well-confirmed, though inconsistent theories, is the theory of general 
relativity and quantum mechanics. See the contributions in the edited volume of Callender and Huggett (2001) for 
contemporary approaches to reconciling general relativity and quantum mechanics. 
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should be sufficiently probable, and this makes sense given that truth is a goal of science. However, 
it is not plausible that the goals of science are simply to discover theories that are highly probable.  
The idea that science cares about more than probable truth has been influentially voiced by 
Popper (1980: 416): “Science does not aim, primarily, at high probabilities. It aims at a high 
informative content, well backed by experience. But a hypothesis may be very probable simply 
because it tells us nothing, or very little.” For instance, a Moliere-esque hypothesis which attributes 
an unspecified dispositional property to account for the data will have a probability of unity or near 
unity. Of course, such hypotheses are not at all worthy of being taken seriously, not worthy of 
commitment, which shows that high probability is not the only goal of science.39 
4.2 Sketches of an IBE-ist Theory of Acceptance 
The foregoing discussion suggests that what makes for an acceptable scientific hypothesis then just 
is some appropriate balance of probability and informative content. But this approach will not be 
entirely satisfactory. It is true that scientists do prefer theories with high informative content, but it 
is not just any kind of content, since information comes cheap. One can trivially further the goal of 
informative content by artificially logically strengthening one’s hypothesis, e.g. by tacking on an 
irrelevant conjunct. In principle, tacking on an irrelevant conjunct could bring about a greater 
balance of probability and content. But this is counter-intuitive. Since it seems implausible that such 
an artificial maneuver could in principle make a hypothesis more scientifically respectable, it is not 
sufficient to say that an acceptable hypothesis consists in some appropriate balance of probability 
and informative content. Rather, the information has to have the right character.  
 Here is where IBE can help. Instead of informative content, we might say that another goal 
of science besides truth is to discover theories with a high degree of explanatory content, where a 
theory’s explanatory content is a function of how well it does with respect to the list of 
                                               
39 It should be noted, valuing informative content is not an aesthetic idiosyncrasy on the part of scientists; rather, we 
assume, and with good reason backed by experience, that whatever the truth is, that truth is a substantive truth.  
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informational virtues put forth by IBE-ists. Unlike Popper’s conception of informative content 
which seems to be just a function of the logical strength of H, the explanatory content of H is a two-
place relation, depending in part on the intrinsic nature of H, but also on how H is related to E. This 
is because some of the informational virtues put forth by IBE-ists depend on how well H serves as 
an explanation of E. For example, to know if H1 provides a more precise mechanism than H2, and 
thus has a higher degree of explanatory content, we need to know what E is which is to be causally 
explained. For this reason, the acceptability of H must be relativized to E. A hypothesis might be 
acceptable in some contexts but not in others. For other virtues, such as scope, whether H1 has a 
higher degree of scope than H2 can be evaluated independently of what our evidence happens to be.  
With this in mind, IBE construed as a theory of acceptance says that the extent to which T1 
is an acceptable theory—in the sense of being worthy of commitment in the way described in 
above—depends on the extent to which T1 is probable and explanatorily contentful. T1 is acceptable 
just in case T1 has a sufficiently high degree of probable truth and explanatory content, and T1 is 
more acceptable than some rival T2 just in case T1 has a greater combination of probable truth and 
explanatory content than T2. While Pr(T1) is a component of the acceptability of T1—not as an 
arbitrary stipulation, but because truth is a goal of science—IBE regarded as a theory of one 
particular notion of scientific acceptance does not say that if T1 does well with regards to the 
informational virtues, then that fact makes T1 more probable. Rendered in this way, IBE would be 
compatible with Bayesianism because the latter is silent on which theories are worth committing to 
for the purposes of deliberation, explanation, and further inquiry into phenomena.40   
                                               
40 This approach is similar to the epistemic utility theory of Isaac Levi (1967), according to which theory choice is a 
pragmatic, decision-theoretic problem mediated by the two distinct and competing goals of truth and informative 
content. Others who advocate a similar view, whereby truth and content combine to fix what it is that we ought to 
believe, include Hintikka and Pietarine (1966), Maher (1993), and Huber (2007). One could locate IBE in this framework 
as well, but this involves radically re-thinking the connection between full belief and degrees of belief, as full belief 
would no longer be solely determined by degrees of belief, but would be partly determined by pragmatic factors. 
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On my proposal then, IBE-ists should not think of the compatibilist project as that of 
spelling out the constraints put on the a priori correct probability function p, as Weisberg (2009) 
claims; rather, if I am right that IBE in its most well-articulated forms cannot be defended as a 
theory of scientific inference, then IBE-ists should instead see their project as that of spelling out 
the nature of explanatory content. In addition to the informational virtues already discussed, we might 
add fertility, or the extent to which a theory opens up new avenues of research or points to new areas 
where problem-solving will be needed. Psillos (2002: 615) cites the virtue of importance, according to 
which, if H1 and H2 both fail to explain all the relevant data, but H1, unlike H2 explains “the most 
salient phenomena”, then H1 is preferable to H2. Like all the informational virtues, it is not clear why 
a hypothesis that explains the most salient phenomena—however “salience” is understood—should 
be more likely to be true. But explaining the most salient phenomena may be relevant to the 
explanatory content of the theory, and if a goal of science is to offer explanations by finding theories 
with a high degree of explanatory content, then insofar as a theory exhibits the virtue of importance, 
then that fact is relevant to whether we ought to commit to that theory.   
Spelling out the nature of explanatory content, will of course be no easy task. For a fully 
satisfactory IBE-ist theory of acceptability, much more would need to be said by way of identifying 
and analyzing the particular informational virtues than can be said here. Once a clearer picture of the 
nature of scope, precision, mechanism, and the other explanatory virtues is provided, we will have a 
clearer picture of IBE construed here as a theory of acceptance. Luckily, some virtues such as 
mechanism are already the subject of extensive analysis (e.g. Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000), 
and IBE-ists have provided some—albeit sketchy—descriptions of the other virtues. 
Even without the details, we can see that the notion of acceptance that I have spelled out 
here makes good sense of how we ought to regard certain classes of hypotheses. First, it follows that 
vacuous explanations are not acceptable. Let H=“either it is raining or it is not raining” and let 
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E=“salt dissolves in water”. Clearly, Pr(H) = 1. However, H does not explain E at all, and so the 
explanatory content of H with respect to E is little to none. In general, tautologies, such as H, 
should never be a candidate for scientific acceptance. Certainly, logical theorems and definitions can 
be part of a contentful theory worth pursuing. But one should not accept H in this context. As van 
Fraassen (1980: 4) nicely puts it, acceptance involves “continuing the dialogue with nature in the 
framework of one conceptual scheme rather than another”, and tautologies such as “either it is 
raining or it is not raining” just seem like the wrong sort of entity to fill this role. 
Second, given that the notion of acceptance I articulate here takes into account probable 
truth as well as explanatory content, no contradiction will be acceptable as worthy of pursuit, since 
obviously for any contradiction ⊥, Pr(⊥)=0. On top of that, while contradictions may be maximally 
informative in the sense of entailing every proposition, contradictions are not capable of having 
explanatory content in the relevant sense. It’s not clear how a contradiction could explain anything. 
This is another reason to prefer a notion of explanatory content over mere, informative content 
when determining which hypotheses are candidates for commitment as a research program. 
Third, the notion of acceptance I defend here makes sense of how we ought to regard catch-
all hypotheses. Let H = General Theory of Relativity (GTR) and ~H = Not-General Theory of 
Relativity (Not-GTR). In this case, ~H is equivalent to a large disjunction of every other alternative, 
incompatible theory of gravity, some of which haven’t yet been thought of. Since the catch-all is 
equivalent to a disjunction of every other hypothesis in a partition—whose probabilities by Finite 
Additivity we sum—often the catch-all will have a greater probability than any specific hypothesis, at 
least at the beginning of inquiry. But, even though in our case Pr(~H) may be high, the explanatory 
content of ~H will not be high. It is not clear how a disjunction of disparate theories of gravity can 
be very explanatory, and so it is not clear how ~H in our case can excel with respect to the IBE-ist 
informational virtues. While in some cases the catch-all may be an acceptable hypothesis with 
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explanatory content—e.g., when the hypothesis space can be enumerated—in cases of general 
theories such as GTR, the catch-all, despite its high probability, is not a hypothesis that scientists 
could commit to as a research program and in terms of which continue the dialogue with nature.  
Finally, an appeal to informational virtues could play a role as a kind of “tie-breaker” in cases 
of under-determination. If, for two competing hypotheses H1 and H2, Pr(H1)=Pr(H2), then if H1 
better excels with respect to the informational virtues than H2, then we ought to accept H1 as more 
worthy of commitment. Crucially, however, the fact that H1 exceeds H2 in explanatory content, i.e. 
better manifests the informational virtues, does not make H1 more likely to be true.
 It’s possible that 
both H1 and H2 are acceptable, if for example, the explanatory content of H2 is also sufficiently high. 
After all, although it is irrational to believe inconsistent theories, it is not irrational to accept 
inconsistent theories, as demonstrated by the case of the 19th conflict between physics and biology 
 On this point, however, one might object that since the notion of acceptance that I spell out 
includes probable truth as a component, it would seem to follow that no one can accept both H1 and 
H2, since Pr(H1&H2)=0. Thus, it seems that it isn’t possible to commit to competing theories.
41  In 
my view, this problem can be avoided. Recall that contradictions don’t seem explanatory. If that’s 
true, then H1&H2 doesn’t have any explanatory content, and so its acceptability value is zero. Even 
though H1 is explanatory and H2 is explanatory, it does not follow that the pair is explanatory. The 
sense in which both H1 and H2 are acceptable is that scientists would be justified in committing 
either to H1 or H2, or both individually, working on H1 and H2 at different times, perhaps. The 
conjunction H1&H2 is not acceptable, but this is no problem because H1&H2 is not explanatory 
Conclusion 
As I have argued, if we distinguish between the probability and the acceptability of a hypothesis, 
then we can see why Bayesianism and IBE are compatible. IBE is a theory of when we should 
                                               
41 I owe this objection to an anonymous reviewer.  
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accept a hypothesis in one particular sense, and Bayesianism tells us what credence we ought to 
assign to a hypothesis. While the question of when we should accept  a hypothesis is in part 
determined by how highly probable the hypothesis happens to be—since truth is a goal of science—
IBE can, when cast as a theory of acceptance, respect all that Bayesianism has to say about the 
matter of truth. However, since Bayesianism is silent on the issue of acceptance, and probable truth 
does not exhaust the conditions under which a hypothesis is worthy of commitment, there is some 
substantive, interesting role for the explanatory virtues to play in our account of scientific practice. 
 In my view, it is reasonable to think of IBE as a theory of acceptance. While the Objective 
Bayesian approach to compatibilism discussed in section 3 amounts to a coherent position, the extra 
normative constraints proposed by the view are difficult to defend. This is ultimately, as I have 
argued, because IBE upholds as confirmational virtues certain properties that do not necessarily 
have confirmational import. In fact, IBE’s mixing confirmational and informational virtues is what 
gives the illusion that we are warranted in believing the hypothesis that is the best explanation in virtue 
of its being the best explanation. To be sure, sometimes the best explanation is one that is highly 
probable. Supposing that IBE is a theory of acceptance, then the hypothesis we are warranted in 
accepting is sometimes the hypothesis that we are also warranted in believing. But when we are 
warranted in believing a hypothesis H, that is because the value of Pr(H) is sufficiently high. But the 
reason that Pr(H) is high is because of the confirmational virtues, most of which, it seems, can be 
explicated from within the Bayesian framework. Even though the non-confirmational explanatory 
virtues upheld by IBE-ists do not make H more likely to be true, they do make H a better 
hypothesis because they give H greater explanatory content, and thus make H more worthy of 
commitment as a research program. 
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